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Abstract  
This paper examines the use of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a tool of interpretation. 
Specifically, it assesses the influence of the Charter on the CJEU’s existing purposive approach 
to the interpretation of employment legislation.  From its inception, the Charter has been lauded 
for its inclusion of a number of employee-protective rights. The CJEU’s early use of the Charter 
certainly appeared promising, with a number of legislative provisions seeming to be bolstered by 
a fundamental rights reading. On closer inspection, has the Charter really made any difference? It 
is shown that the Charter is simultaneously evolutionary and yet revolutionary. It is 
evolutionary in that the social rights derive largely from pre-existing legislation which has 
long been given a purposive and usually employee-friendly reading. It is revolutionary in 
that the economic freedoms, although similarly steeped in long standing jurisprudence, 
have emboldened the CJEU to disrupt existing approaches to the interpretation of 
legislation. Of particular concern is the CJEU’s radical reinterpretation of the freedom to 
conduct a business in the case of Alemo-Herron.  
Key words: Charter, social rights, economic rights, purposive interpretation  
I. Introduction 
It is said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, a sentiment well-illustrated by 
the judiciary’s chequered use of fundamental rights in the employment law context. 
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Perhaps the ultimate expression of judicial good will has been the Court of Justice of the 
EU’s (CJEU) embrace of a fundamental rights discourse in the interpretation of EU 
employment legislation. This paper seeks to assess the place of fundamental rights among 
the CJEU’s existing repertoire of interpretative tools. But, as has become customary, we 
must begin with a number of reservations. First, this paper falls into the trap so forcefully 
(if somewhat unfairly) highlighted by Gestel and Micklitz that EU doctrinal research has 
become too focused on the Court of Justice as its point of reference.1 They argue that EU 
academics seem to have ‘more trust in the supranational courts than in the EU legislature’, 
which ‘could be a first indication for herd behaviour; legal scholars following a wider trend 
without critical reflection’.2  As we shall see, however, those turning to the EU legislature 
for interpretative guidance will be sorely disappointed.  As such, I hope my own court-
watching can be forgiven on this occasion. Second, given constraints of space and time, 
particular attention will be placed on the CJEU’s use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(the Charter) rather than on other fundamental rights instruments such as the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) or the Community Social Charter. This is largely because the Charter was 
intended to codify the EU’s existing fundamental rights acquis. Finally, on the methodology 
adopted by this paper, it is of course notoriously difficult to measure the ‘impact’ of any 
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3 
 
external source on judicial behaviour. This is perhaps particularly so in the case law of the 
CJEU, with its terse reasoning and absence of dissenting opinions. As such, an attempt has 
been made to assess both the quantitative, but more importantly the qualitative effects of 
the Charter on the CJEU’s methods of interpretation. The relative weight of Charter 
arguments in the interpretation of employment legislation will be explored. This has been 
done by examining the precise point of entry of such arguments in the CJEU’s reasoning. 
Essentially, the question is whether fundamental rights arguments are crucial to the 
outcome of cases or whether they simply act as ornaments or rhetorical flourishes.   
A useful benchmark against which to answer this question are the CJEU’s pre-existing 
interpretative methods. The limitations of the literal approach to EU legislation will be 
outlined before turning to the CJEU’s preference for contextual and teleological approaches 
(Section II). This will be followed by an examination of the Charter as a tool of 
interpretation (Section III) before turning to the uneasy relationship between fundamental 
rights arguments and the interpretation of employment legislation (Section IV). Two 
aspects will be dealt with. First, there is the question of whether the Charter has led to a 
change in the CJEU’s approach to the interpretation of employment legislation. It will be 
shown that the purposive or teleological approach remains dominant but that the Charter 
may lead to a blurring of the telos of employment legislation. In some cases, the Charter 
adds little to an interpretation that could have been achieved using existing methods. In 
others, the Charter diverts the CJEU from the true purpose of the legislation. It is rare that 
the Charter adds any practical value to the interpretative task.  
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The second aspect considered is the CJEU’s à la carte approach to fundamental rights, with 
the economic appearing to dominate the social. From its inception, the Charter had been 
lauded for its inclusion of employee-protective rights. The CJEU’s early use of the Charter 
certainly appeared promising, with a number of legislative provisions apparently being 
bolstered by a fundamental rights reading. On closer inspection, labour lawyers should 
have been careful what they wished for. Although the CJEU continues to interpret 
employment legislation through a fundamental rights lens, the prescription has changed. 
Out go the social rights, to be replaced by a magnified, or even distorted, concept of 
fundamental economic freedoms. This ‘pick and choose’ approach to the Charter has 
worrying implications for employment legislation, with the CJEU demonstrating its 
willingness to embrace a strong notion of economic freedom, whilst fundamental social 
rights are discarded at the side of the road as mere ‘principles’.  
II. The Baseline: The Existing Interpretative Methods of the CJEU 
Much attention has been devoted to assessing the methods of interpretation adopted by the 
CJEU and it is not the intention of this paper to revisit this topic. Rather, the CJEU’s pre-
Charter approach to the interpretation of secondary legislation both generally (Section A) 
and more specifically in the employment context will be outlined (Section B). This Section 
will serve as the benchmark against which to examine the impact of the Charter on the 
CJEU’s approach to interpretation.   
A. What’s the Purpose of Interpretation?  
According to Fennelly, the object of interpretation ‘lies in the true intention of the 
lawmakers, whether they be framers of a constitution or a treaty, legislators or drafters of 
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secondary legislation’.3 However, the interpretation of EU law ‘demands of the common 
lawyer a readiness to set sail from the secure anchorage and protective haven of “plain 
words” and to explore the wider seas of purpose and context’.4 In order to assess the 
impact of fundamental rights arguments on the CJEU’s reasoning it will be necessary to set 
out briefly its existing methods of interpretation.  
First of all, we must determine when a provision of EU law may need to be interpreted. It 
goes without saying that legislation requires interpretation when there are doubts as to the 
meaning of its provisions. This may be for a number of reasons, including linguistic 
uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, imprecision, incompleteness, value pluralism, rule 
instability, gaps in the law, and most importantly in the context of Union legislation; open 
textured language.5 There are of course additional complications associated with the 
interpretation of EU law, notably multilingualism and a rather opaque legislative drafting 
process associated with the quest for compromise and consensus. These specific features 
only serve to heighten the difficulties of interpretative tools found in all national legal 
systems.  
An added difficulty for the interpretation of EU legislation is that it must be interpreted in 
accordance with the Treaties (which now include the Charter). This is further complicated 
by the fact that the Treaties themselves require interpretation and often contain even 
vaguer and more open-textured language than legislation. Such indeterminate values as 
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‘human dignity’, ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘equality’, ‘ever closer union’, ‘solidarity’, 
‘cooperation’, ‘justice’ and ‘citizenship’ pepper the Treaty without any guidance as to how 
such values should be used or interpreted. Of course, some of these concepts have been 
further developed in secondary legislation leading to a certain symbiosis or indeed 
circularity, more of which below. An additional factor in EU law is that it is not always clear 
that a question of interpretation even needs to be referred to the CJEU in the first place. In 
CILFIT, the CJEU clarified that national courts are not obliged to refer a question in cases 
‘where previous decisions of the Court have already dealt with the point in law in 
question…even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical’.6 A question is 
further defined as acte clair when ‘the correct application of Community law may be so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the 
question is to be resolved’.7 A final complicating factor is the structure of the CJEU’s 
judgments, which have been so heavily influenced by both French legal reasoning and by 
the French language. This has led to what Beck describes as certain ‘building blocks’ in the 
CJEU’s judgments, ‘that is, paragraphs which occur again and again in identical or nearly 
the same form in the Court’s case law on particular subjects’ which serves to further 
promote ‘vagueness and general uncertainty about the precise meaning of the Court’s 
pronouncements and the state of the case law’.8 These building blocks may lead to a false 
sense of familiarity and to an (over)reaction to minor changes in the language used. The 
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above difficulties associated with EU legislation lead to an inherent weakness in literal 
approaches to interpretation.  
Having determined that a provision needs to be interpreted, we must look to the tools used 
to interpret it. Turning to the Treaties or secondary legislation for guidance is of little use 
as neither contain any provision governing interpretation. It is of necessity, therefore, that 
we must turn to the case law of the CJEU to discover its interpretative criteria. From a very 
early stage the CJEU has insisted that in interpreting the Treaties ‘it is necessary to consider 
the spirit, the general scheme and the wording’ of the relevant provision.9 Itzcovich 
identifies three more precise interpretive criteria used by the CJEU – linguistic, systemic 
and dynamic.10 Linguistic criteria involve the derivation of legal arguments from the 
semantic and syntactic features of the different language versions of an EU provision 
(wording).11 Such an approach includes a determination of the ‘proper meaning of the 
words’ which is at the heart of literal interpretation.12 Given the peculiarities of EU law, 
such an approach is not always appropriate or desirable. As such, the CJEU has benefited 
from more expansive interpretative criteria. This brings us to the second criteria, namely 
systemic or contextual interpretation which takes into consideration other provisions of 
the same legal text or other areas of the legal system (general scheme). In such cases, the 
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legal provision is to be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the ‘system’.13 Finally, 
dynamic criteria of interpretation look not to the text but the objectives pursued by EU law 
(spirit).14 It is these dynamic criteria of interpretation that are ‘the most characteristic of 
the [CJEU’s] legal reasoning’.15  
Dynamic reasoning may be further broken down into three categories. First, there is a 
functional interpretation, which assumes that a provision should be interpreted in the 
manner that best ensures the realisation of the goal it seeks to achieve. Second, and most 
importantly in the EU context, there is the teleological or purposive approach under which 
a provision should be interpreted in accordance with the goals or purposes of a legal order 
or legislative scheme. A corollary to the teleological method is the doctrine of effectiveness. 
This means that ‘the Court identifies that interpretation of a text that contributes most 
adequately to the achievement of the objective embodied in the rule of [Union] law under 
examination’.16  
Of course this classification is beset by limitations but for present purposes, it will act as 
useful shorthand for the division of interpretative approaches adopted by the CJEU. We 
now turn to examine how the CJEU applies these methods to the interpretation of 
employment legislation.  
                                                          
13 ibid 552.  
14 ibid 549.  
15 ibid 555.  
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Communities and Their Relevance for the Scope of the EEC Competition Rules’ (1991) 15 Fordham Int'l L J 
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A. Interpreting EU Employment Legislation  
In the interpretation of secondary employment legislation, the CJEU adopts the same 
purposive/teleological method used in other contexts.17 EU employment legislation 
contains specific terms that must be given autonomous Union meanings. We need only 
think of the controversy surrounding the definition of the ‘worker’ or ‘pay’ in Union law 
and the complex relationship between the Union definition and national legal systems.18 In 
this respect, a literal interpretation would be wholly inadequate. As such, the CJEU will 
‘seek to resolve the legal uncertainty by reference to the purpose, general scheme and/or 
normative status of the measure as well as the context in which it is to be applied’.19 As we 
shall see, the closest thing we have in legislation as a guide to interpretation are the recitals 
which often themselves contain concepts that ‘are either open-textured, vague and/or 
essentially contested concepts…They embody frequently conflicting goals that are 
sufficiently vaguely defined to allow the Court a very great margin of appreciation in 
interpreting, reinterpreting and re-configuring the purposive framework’.20  
Even the briefest of glances at the pre-Charter case law on EU employment legislation 
demonstrates teleology in action. The usual (although not universal) result is an employee-
protective reading of the relevant legislation. Two Directives have been chosen to serve as 
the benchmark against which the Charter’s impact on the CJEU’s interpretative method will 
                                                          
17 Itzcovich (n 11) 542.  
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be assessed. These are the Working Time Directive (WTD)21 and the Transfer of 
Undertakings Directive (TUD).22 These pieces of legislation have been chosen for their 
particularly close connection to fundamental rights arguments. The Equal Treatment 
Directive has been excluded because equality as a general principle has enjoyed a long 
history in EU law and as such has infused the interpretation of legislation from the very 
beginning. In addition, the equality concept is intimately linked with the Treaties, 
somewhat impeding an assessment of the Charter’s role in this context.  
i. The Working Time Directive  
The Working Time Directive is a good starting point given that it has been one of the most 
litigated pieces of EU employment legislation. Its purpose is to lay down minimum 
requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers through 
approximation of national provisions concerning, in particular, the duration of working 
time. The recitals of the Directive show that it has a highly worker-protective telos; ‘[t]he 
improvement of workers’ safety, hygiene and health…is an objective which should not be 
subordinated to purely economic considerations’; ‘[a]ll workers should have adequate rest 
periods’; ‘…the organisation of work according to a certain pattern must take account of the 
general principle of adapting work to the worker’. The recitals go on to recognise the need 
                                                          
21 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299/9. 
22 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts 
of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. 
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for flexibility, but even this is said to be conditional on ‘ensuring compliance with the 
principle of protecting the safety and health of workers’.  
Of course, the Directive itself contains a comprehensive list of definitions. Working time is 
defined in article 2(1) as ‘any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s 
disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or 
practices’. It is immediately apparent that this seemingly comprehensive definition is in 
reality emptied of all content in the absence of further fleshing out, a task that has been left 
to the CJEU. The Court has consistently held that both working time and rest time may not 
be interpreted in accordance with national law but rather ‘constitute concepts of Union law 
which must be defined in accordance with objective characteristics by reference to the 
scheme and purpose of the Working Time Directive’.23 The reason for adopting the 
purposive or teleological approach in this context was to secure the full efficacy and 
uniform application of those concepts in all Member States and any other interpretation 
would ‘frustrate’ the objective of the Directive. Furthermore, the CJEU declared that this 
interpretation was the only one that accorded with the purpose of the Directive.24 This 
approach is particularly interesting, as the CJEU is saying that although it has been left the 
task of interpreting the legislation—which was clearly open to interpretation or the 
question would never have arisen—it was only realistically capable of one interpretation.  
As such, the CJEU was able to adopt an expansive interpretation of ‘working time’ in SIMAP 
to include inactive on-call time.25 The CJEU has repeatedly held that, in view of both the 
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12 
 
wording of the directive (literal interpretation) and its purpose (purposive/teleological 
interpretation) and scheme (schematic interpretation), its various provisions ‘constitute 
rules of Union social law of particular importance from which every worker must benefit as 
a minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of is safety and health’.26  
In Commission v United Kingdom, the CJEU rejected the distinction drawn by the UK 
Government between limits and entitlements in the WTD. For the UK, the employer was 
only under an obligation to actively ensure that workers actually benefit from limits to 
working time but not entitlements such as rest periods. The CJEU held that such a 
distinction was unsustainable as ‘neither the various language versions of the Directive nor 
the Court’s case-law relating to the Directive, its objective, and the nature of the rights to 
rest which it lays down support the distinction between entitlements and limits’.27 In the 
context of paid annual leave, we see the CJEU once again repeating the formula that this 
entitlement is ‘a particularly important principle of Union social law from which there can 
be no derogations’. This led the CJEU in BECTU to find that the expression contained in 
Article 7(1) WTD ‘in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of 
such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice’ must be interpreted as 
referring only to the arrangements for paid annual leave and not the existence of that 
right.28 
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Despite the CJEU’s embrace of the purposive approach in the context of working time, it 
will not go so far as to violate the clear wording of a legislative provision, regardless of the 
consequences for employees. In Bowden for example, the CJEU held that article 1(3) of the 
original WTD, which excluded all workers, including non-mobile (ie office) workers, in the 
transport sector from the scope of the Directive was intended to do just that. This was 
despite the fact that the workers in question were being denied a social right of particular 
importance.29  
ii. The Transfer of Undertakings Directive  
The preamble to the Transfer of Undertakings Directive recognises that ‘economic trends 
are bringing in their wake, at both national and [Union] level, changes in the structure of 
undertakings, through transfers’. It further emphasises that ‘it was necessary to provide for 
the protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular to ensure 
that their rights are safeguarded’. In other words, the Directive is intended to protect those 
employees who are performing the same job but under the orders of a different employer 
and as such, the term ‘rights and obligations’ is broadly construed.30 As Barnard notes,31 
the CJEU has been particularly influenced by this wording,32 being prepared to give a 
                                                          
29 Case C-133/00 Bowden [2001] ECR I-7031.  
30 Case C-4/01 Martin [2003] ECR I-12859.  
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32 Case C-135/83 Abels v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie [1985] 
ECR 469 para 6; Case C-19/83 Wendelboe v L.J. Music [1985] ECR 457 para 8; Case C-105/84 Foreningen af 
Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Danmols Inventar  [1985] ECR 2639 para 15; Case C-24/85 Spijkers v Benedik 
[1986] ECR 1119 para 6. 
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purposive interpretation to ‘ensure as far as possible that the contract of employment or 
employment relationship continues unchanged with the transferee, in order to prevent the 
workers concerned from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the 
transfer’.33  
Of course, for the rights to be engaged there must have been a transfer of an undertaking. 
How the notion of a ‘transfer’ is interpreted becomes crucial, and yet being typical of EU 
employment legislation, it is left (deliberately?) vague. If we turn to article 1(b) of the 
Directive we see that there is a transfer where (1) an economic entity; (2) has been 
transferred and (3) that entity retains its identity following the transfer. Article 1(1)(a) 
provides that the Directive’s provisions apply to the transfer of an undertaking as a result 
of a ‘legal transfer or merger’. This concept has been defined purposively. A number of 
language versions of the provision seemed to suggest that only contractual transfers were 
covered, whereas other versions (notably the English term ‘legal transfer’), suggested it 
was wide enough to cover other forms of non-contractual transfer.34 The CJEU rejected the 
narrower definition, looking to the purpose of the Directive and finding that it can apply to 
all types of transfer.35  
Particularly problematic has been the CJEU’s interpretation of the third limb, namely that 
the entity has retained its identity post transfer. In early cases, the CJEU tended to look at 
                                                          
33 Case C-287/86 Landsorganisationen i Danmark for Tjenerforbundet i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro [1987] ECR 
5465 para 25; Case C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v Astley [2005] ECR I-4389 para 26.  
34 Barnard, EU Employment Law (n 31).  
35 Case C-135/83 Abels; Case C-478/03 Celtec; Case C-29/91 Redmond Stichting v Bartol and Others [1992] 
ECR I-3189. 
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the labour law test focusing on similarity of activity. Adopting this labour law test was 
more employee-protective as it was likely to lead to a finding that a transfer had taken 
place.36 This was entirely consistent with the Directive’s employee-protection objectives. 
However, in Süzen, the CJEU adopted a commercial law test, finding that the fact that 
activities pre and post transfer are similar, even identical, does not lead to the conclusion 
that an economic entity has retained its identity.37 This left open the question as to how the 
national court was to determine when a transfer of an ‘economic entity’ had taken place. 
The CJEU distinguished two different types of business, assets based and non-assets based. 
With assets based companies, there would be a transfer only where significant tangible or 
intangible assets were transferred. With non-assets based businesses, ie in labour intensive 
businesses, there is a transfer only where the transferees takes over a majority of the 
transferor’s staff. It is apparent that either approach would allow the transferee to avoid its 
obligations under the Directive as ‘if few assets are transferred the transferee can avoid the 
Directive by refusing to employ the ‘major part’ of the workforce. This test renders the 
Directive in many cases a ‘voluntary obligation’, contrary to the spirit of a Directive 
designed to give employment protection.38 This was perhaps another early warning-shot 
that although the CJEU continues to adopt a purposive reading of employment legislation, 
this may not always lead to an employee-protective reading.  
What, then, can we take from the CJEU’s pre-Charter approach to the interpretation of 
employment legislation? We can see that invariably the structure of the judgments start by 
                                                          
36 Case C-392/92 Schmidt [1994] ECR I-1311.  
37 Case C-13/95 Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH [1997] ECR I-1259 para 15.  
38 Barnard, EU Employment Law (n 31) 597.  
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setting out in some detail, the relevant legislative provisions (including the preambles) of 
both the EU legislation and the relevant national implementing legislation. In some cases, 
the CJEU leaves it at that, referring back to these provisions only sparingly. In other cases, 
the CJEU draws heavily from the recitals39 which play a strong role in the subsequent 
interpretation. We also see that the CJEU places less emphasis on the legal basis of the 
legislation in the Treaty. It appears that the CJEU will limit itself to interpretation within 
the framework of the legislation, turning only to primary law if the telos is not clear. In 
other cases, particularly in the working time context, the CJEU has drawn heavily from 
international rights instruments,40 as well as related legislative provisions.41 All of the 
above is done is pursuit of the purpose of the legislation,42 whilst ensuring the effectiveness 
and uniform application of EU law.43 In some cases, the CJEU goes beyond the purposive 
                                                          
39 Cases C-484/04 Commission v United Kingdom para 2; Case C-173/99 BECTU para 37; Case C-135/83 Abels 
para 17; Case C-80/14 USDAW para 45.  
40 Case C-151/02 Jaeger para 47; Case C-173/99 BECTU para 39.  
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approach by adopting a consequentialist analysis of the impact of various interpretations 
on employees.44  
In summary, the CJEU takes a broad, purposive/teleological approach to interpretation. 
The CJEU looks to the objectives as a starting point and attempts to fit the interpretation to 
this objective wherever possible. It usually does so without violating the meaning of the 
words. However, the case law provides an early glimpse of the fact that the CJEU does not 
shy away from reassessing the purpose of employment legislation in order to achieve a 
particular goal which may not always be employee-protective.  
III. Fundamental Rights as a Vehicle of Interpretation  
Having set out the CJEU’s purposive approach to the interpretation of employment 
legislation, we can now proceed to examine the place of fundamental rights within this 
interpretative scheme. Of course, with all the discussion surrounding the Charter as an 
interpretative tool, we may lose sight of the fact that the fundamental rights have long been 
used as a tool of interpretation in the guise of general principles of EU law (Section A). This 
will be followed by a look at the Charter’s potential use as a vehicle for interpretation 
(Section B).  
A. Back to the Future: Fundamental Rights as General Principles 
It will be recalled that the general principles of EU law are those principles that have been 
derived—largely by the CJEU—from unwritten rules not contained in the Treaty or 
                                                          
44 Case C-151/02 Jaeger para 65; Case C-173/99 BECTU para 49; Case C-4/01 Martin para 46; Case C-135/83 
Abels para 22.  
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secondary legislation. The reason for the CJEU’s ‘discovery’ of fundamental rights as 
general principles results largely from the absence of any explicit commitment to 
fundamental rights contained in the founding Treaties. One function of the general 
principles is to act an aid to interpretation, allowing the Court to ‘follow an evolutive 
interpretation and be responsive to changes in the economic and political order’.45 Of 
course, the general principles are highly value-based and inherently vague and ‘[l]inguistic 
uncertainty at the level of principles therefore translates directly into secondary 
interpretative legal uncertainty’.46  
Initially, the CJEU was reluctant to allow litigants to invoke the fundamental rights they 
may have enjoyed in national law. This approach changed significantly following the 
Stauder case in which the CJEU held that the right to human dignity, found in German law, 
was part of the legal order of the Union itself.47 Although the EU’s commitment to 
fundamental rights via the general principles is to be broadly welcomed, the potential for 
unforeseen consequences was largely underestimated at the time. In fact, the debate as to 
the place of fundamental rights within the EU’s legal order continues to prove contentious, 
a situation that, as we shall see, has not been resolved by the introduction of the Charter. As 
Leczykiewicz has remarked, ‘[d]oes the category of fundamental rights as concepts of EU 
law infuse that legal system primarily or exclusively with social values or is it perhaps a 
                                                          
45 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn OUP 2006) 18.  
46 Beck (n 5) 166.  
47 Case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR I-419.  
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vehicle of another transformation, towards greater liberalization and deregulation?’.48 
Despite such uncertainties, the CJEU’s approach to interpretation in fundamental rights 
cases even more closely conforms to the purposive/teleological paradigm, reflecting a 
number of factors including ‘the lack of detailed secondary legislation, conceptual 
vagueness in the key treaty provisions and value pluralism in the sense that many cases 
involve a clash between conflicting norms of roughly equal status’.49 In the employment 
context, the impact of the general principles has been most keenly felt in the equality field.  
Take, for example, the case of P v S, where the general principle of equality was used to 
grant an expansive reading to the Equal Treatment Directive.50 The CJEU was here tasked 
with determining whether discrimination on the ground of gender could be extended to 
cases of gender reassignment. The CJEU held that ‘the scope of the [Directive] cannot be 
confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other gender. 
In view of its purpose and the nature of the rights that it seeks to safeguard, the scope of 
the directive is also such as to apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the 
gender reassignment of the person concerned’.51 
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 As O’Leary notes, ‘[t]he sequence of the Court’s reasoning in this case in instructive. It 
recalled that the Equal Treatment Directive was but the expression, in a particular field, of 
the principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law and that the 
right not to be discriminated against on grounds of gender is one of the fundamental 
human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to ensure’.52 In other words, the CJEU 
took as its starting point the need to respect fundamental rights (read the need to respect 
the purpose/objectives of the legislation) when determining the scope of the legislation, 
rather than first assessing the scope and then verifying whether fundamental rights had, in 
that context, been respected.53 Strains of this approach can also be seen in the controversial 
decisions in Mangold54 and Kücüdeveci55 which, although not concerning the interpretation 
of EU legislation, appear to show the scope of EU equality law being extended through the 
use of general principles, with the legislation in those cases being but mere specific 
expressions of a general principle. 
A complicated and as yet unanswered question is the relationship between the general 
principles and the Charter. The Charter was merely intended to codify or render more 
visible existing EU fundamental rights. This then begs the question of whether the Charter 
was intended to replace the general principles or whether the two sources are coterminous 
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and mutually dependent. Most commentators appear to agree that the CJEU’s primary point 
of reference is and should now be the Charter as this is ‘in keeping with the intentions of 
the Treaty authors, which granted the Charter the same value as that of the Treaties’ and is 
‘also more in keeping with the national constitutional culture which, bred in a civil law 
tradition, feel more comfortable with written lists of rights’.56 Of course, this overlooks the 
fact that the general principles themselves have been explicitly recognised in the 
constitutional text, although whether this grants constitutional status to their content 
remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s case law appears to confirm that the Charter 
will be its primary point of reference. Leaving aside the CJEU’s use of the general principles, 
what is the role for the Charter itself in the interpretation of EU employment legislation?  
B.  The Charter as an Interpretative Tool 
From the outset, the Charter has been characterised by its limited ambitions, being merely 
intended to codify or render more visible fundamental rights as derived from the general 
principles, ECHR, international conventions and the Community Social Charter. Although, 
the Charter ‘very clearly states that it does not extend the field of application of EU law…it 
cannot be excluded, if one examines samples of the Court’s existing case law, that the 
definition and delimitation of the field of EU social and employment law might be 
influenced by the existence of the Charter generally and/or by specific provisions 
thereof’.57 The continued use of the purposive approach in the fundamental rights context 
appears to be facilitated by the Commission which has confirmed that legislative proposals 
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that have a particular link with fundamental rights must include specific recitals that 
explain how the proposals comply with the Charter.58 As such, ‘[t]he inclusion of a subject 
matter, whether in the form of a right or a principle, in the Charter, will of necessity 
influence the manner in which the Court will consider the precise content of the right or 
principle in question, its range of application and the weighing of conflicting interests’.59  
Of course, despite the rhetoric of indivisibility of rights, the Charter’s provisions themselves 
are of potentially differing weight, a fact made (somewhat) explicit in this distinction 
drawn between rights and principles. Article 52(5) of the Charter makes clear that ‘[t]he 
provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and 
executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of 
Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective 
powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in 
ruling on their legality’. Although following AMS, it may be the case that real distinction is 
not between rights and principles, but rather between those rights that are capable of 
direct effect and those that are not (usually the social rights contained in the Solidarity 
Title).60 Although, the two may nevertheless map one onto the other, ie non-directly 
effective rights may in fact be principles . In any case, if we again confine our analysis to the 
use of the Charter as an interpretative tool, it may be that the distinction between rights 
and principles becomes less relevant. Despite this, and as we shall see, the CJEU may lend 
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greater weight to rights as opposed to principles when it comes to interpreting EU 
legislation. 
That the Charter has a role to play in the interpretation of EU legislation should be 
unsurprising given that it is not in itself a source of rights, but rather a list of Union rights 
deriving from various other sources, including legislation. The Explanations attached to the 
Charter, and which act as interpretative guidance, are illustrative in this respect. Many 
Charter provisions that are related to the employment context are stated to derive from 
either EU legislation or existing case law. Particularly relevant for the present discussion 
are article 31 of the Charter on the right to fair and just working conditions and article 16 
on the freedom to conduct a business, which has a potentially far-reaching and cross-
cutting impact on the interpretation of employment legislation.  
Another difficulty in using the Charter as a vehicle of interpretation is that the Charter 
provisions themselves must first be interpreted. If we look to the Explanations, we are 
either confronted with equally vague statements, or we are referred to existing legislative 
provisions and jurisprudence. This has led to the somewhat circular position that EU 
legislation will be interpreted against the backdrop of a Charter which itself is to be 
interpreted through the lens of EU legislation as already interpreted by the CJEU. 
Furthermore, and as Beck notes ‘[e]ven the less abstract, more specific fundamental rights 
such as some of the solidarity rights….are open-ended, imprecise and/or context-
dependent; the relevant definitions in the Charter are often so vague as to raise doubts as 
to their core meaning, substance and justiciability in the absence of further legislation 
24 
 
designed to provide specific protection’.61 It should not be surprising therefore when 
inconsistent results begin to emerge.  
Of course, the Charter can only act as a tool of interpretation if the CJEU chooses to engage 
with it. In many cases, where a fundamental rights link may have been thought to exist, the 
CJEU either finds that the Charter is inapplicable as the case is outside the scope of EU law, 
or it simply ignores the fundamental rights aspect altogether.62 Barnard has recently 
spoken of the silence of the Charter.63 She argues that in some cases the CJEU has been 
unjustifiably reticent in its use of the Charter, notably in the context of the review of 
measures taken by Member States under the troika’s Memoranda of Understanding. In 
other cases, she points to situations in which the CJEU has rightly refused to engage with 
fundamental rights arguments, especially in the context of posted workers. Finally, she 
argues that there are some contexts in which the CJEU would be perfectly justified in 
keeping silent, giving the example of age discrimination. Her concerns largely focus on 
democratic legitimacy, arguing that '[t]he legislative compromise...might not be one that 
the Court...likes, but it is the compromise that the legislature came to. And it would ill 
behove the Court to second guess...using the rhetoric of balancing under the Charter, to 
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produce a different outcome’.64 Another concern is that the use of the Charter may in fact 
obscure the real arguments rather than bringing any clarity. The following represents not 
so much a plea for silence in certain situations, but rather a recognition of the Charter’s 
inherent limitations as an interpretative tool in the employment context despite the 
apparent interpretative role it has been given. It will be shown that the Charter, already 
beset by contradictions, is simultaneously inert and unpredictably dynamic.  
 
 
IV. Fundamental Rights and the Interpretation of EU Employment Legislation 
What then is the added value of bringing fundamental rights arguments to the 
interpretative task? Do they in fact add clarity to judicial reasoning or are they a vehicle for 
judicial activism and incoherent interpretation? There are two elements to be dealt with 
here. In the first instance it will be shown that the Charter’s social rights add very little to 
the interpretation of employment legislation. Their use to date has been limited to 
bolstering an interpretation that could easily have been achieved using existing purposive 
methods that rely on the recitals of the relevant legislation. Where the effect of the Charter 
is felt, however, is that it allows the CJEU to pick and choose from the menu of its 
provisions, allowing for a potential disruption in the telos of social legislation. Once the 
telos has been shifted, this may allow the CJEU in future to interpret employment 
legislation in an entirely different manner (Section A). This situation has been most acutely 
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felt in the CJEU’s radical use of article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business all the while 
ignoring competing social rights (Section B).  
A. What do fundamental rights bring to the table?  
In the first instance, we must ascertain the quantitative impact of the Charter in the 
employment context. A search on the CJEU’s website using the rubric ‘Court of Justice, 
‘social security’, ‘employment’, ‘social policy’ and ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ reveals a 
marked increase in references to the Charter in recent years. We can see that there have 
been 82 judgments65 and 102 Opinions66 to date that match this rubric (although not all of 
these cases concern the interpretation of EU legislation). This demonstrates that the CJEU 
is by now well-used to dealing with the Charter in the employment context. Article 21 on 
the principle of non-discrimination is the most cited Charter provision. Other provisions 
that have been frequently cited are article 28, article 30, article 23 and finally articles 31 
and 16, which form the focus of this paper. But of course, it is not enough that a Charter 
provision has merely been cited by the CJEU or an Advocate General (AG). What is the real 
impact of the Charter arguments? We will once again, take each piece of legislation in turn. 
i. Working Time Directive  
Article 31 of the Charter provides for fair and just working conditions. As the Explanations 
to that provision make clear, this right is largely derived from the Working Time Directive.  
Article 31(2) provides that ‘[e]very worker has the right to limitation of maximum working 
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hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave’. This article, 
perhaps more so than any other provision of the Charter, has played a prominent role as an 
interpretive guide to the WTD. Indeed, in this respect Article 31(2) has been described as ‘a 
pioneering Charter provision in that it had an early and bold impact on the interpretation 
of the right to paid annual leave’.67 Article 31(2) made its first appearance in the Opinion of 
AG Tizzano in BECTU.68 In that case, BECTU, a trade union, argued that the UK Government 
had incorrectly implemented the WTD by imposing conditions (13 weeks’ continuous 
work) on the entitlement to paid annual leave, for which there is no justification in the 
Directive. In what is now considered ‘a landmark Opinion for its use of the Charter as an 
interpretive tool’,69 AG Tizzano thought it appropriate to take a step back from the WTD in 
order to place the entitlement to paid annual leave in the broader context of fundamental 
social rights.70 The right to paid leave, he noted, was not introduced with the adoption of 
the WTD, but rather, it has long been considered a fundamental right. 71 The AG considered 
that the inclusion of a right to paid annual leave in the Charter made it easier to ‘apprehend 
the meaning and scope of the principle laid down in Article 7 of the Directive’.72 Indeed, as 
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a fundamental social right, the right to paid leave is ‘an automatic and unconditional right 
granted to every worker’.73  The fact that the Charter contained a right to paid annual leave 
had the effect of fortifying the AG’s conclusion that the precondition of 13 weeks’ 
continuous employment was an unlawful derogation from an inderogable fundamental 
social right.74 As we have already seen above, the CJEU came to the same conclusion but 
avoided any reference to the Charter—which at this point did not have legal effect— 
preferring instead to classify the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave as a 
‘particularly important principle of Union law’, as demonstrated by the fact that there can 
be no derogations.75 BECTU has been described as exemplifying a pattern of reasoning, that 
would subsequently develop in cases concerning paid annual leave, with the CJEU starting 
with ‘the highly abstract affirmation of its status as a fundamental social right to generate 
specific legal conclusions’.76 But is this really the case? Undoubtedly, the CJEU’s approach in 
BECTU heralded a promising start to the life of the Charter as the Court appeared willing to 
infuse its interpretative task with fundamental rights arguments. If we delve deeper, 
however, can it be said that the Charter has made any real difference to the interpretation 
of employment legislation?  
The CJEU is still adopting a strongly purposive approach, continuing to refer to the recitals 
and the objectives of the legislation but now simply adding the Charter into the teleological 
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mix. We can see this approach in ANGED,77 a case in which the CJEU was asked whether 
Article 7(1) WTD must be interpreted as precluding national provisions under which a 
worker who becomes unfit for work during a period of paid annual leave is not entitled 
subsequently to the paid annual leave which coincided with the period of unfitness for 
work. The CJEU starts by using its well-worn mantra that paid annual leave ‘must be 
regarded as a particularly important principle of European Union social law from which 
there can be no derogations’.78 In the next breath the CJEU states that not only is the right 
particularly important, but that it is also ‘expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the 
Charter’.79 This is the last we hear of the Charter. The CJEU instead reverts to its usual 
approach, noting that ‘the purpose of entitlement to paid annual leave is to enable the 
worker to rest’.80 This pattern is continued in subsequent cases. The CJEU starts by noting 
that paid annual leave is ‘a particularly important principle of European Union social law 
from which there can be no derogations’.81 It then notes—almost in passing—that the right 
is also contained in article 31(2) of the Charter.82 The Court moves on to look at the 
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purpose and objectives of the legislation (as it has always done),83 to find that, in 
accordance with settled case law, concepts such as working time and paid leave must be 
interpreted broadly.84  
That article 31(2) appears not to make a great deal of difference is perhaps unsurprising if 
we remember how closely linked that provision is to the wording of the WTD itself. In 
Fenoll, for example, the CJEU was asked to interpret the term ‘worker’ for the purposes of 
the WTD. In this case, the CJEU more carefully linked the question to the Charter, noting 
that ‘[t]he question to be answered is, therefore, whether Mr Fenoll carries out that activity 
as a worker within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and of Article 31(2) of the 
Charter’.85 In other words, the concept had the same meaning in both the Directive and the 
Charter. Looking to the Charter would not provide any help with determining the 
appropriate interpretation of the ‘worker’ concept. As such, the CJEU simply relied on its 
earlier case law, defining the ‘worker’ broadly.86 AG Mengozzi also highlighted the fact that 
any interpretation of ‘worker’ within the meaning of the WTD must also apply to article 
31(2) of the Charter ‘in order to ensure the uniformity of the scope of application ratione 
personae of the right to paid leave’. 87 He continues that it ‘is clear from the settled case-law 
of the Court that every worker’s right to paid annual leave must be regarded as a 
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particularly important principle of Union social law, henceforth enshrined in Article 31(2) 
of the Charter’.88 The ‘henceforth’ is important in demonstrating continuity and merely 
serves to highlight the fact that the Charter will become a new point of reference. Having 
said that, the legislation itself remains relevant as it must be read ‘in conjunction’ with the 
Charter.89 An unanswered question is whether the CJEU considers ‘a particularly important 
social right’ and the Charter’s social rights to be coterminous. If they are, then again we 
should not be surprised if the Charter has no real bearing on the interpretative outcome. 
Going further, is the WTD but a specific expression of an already existing general principle 
of a right to paid annual leave that is now also reflected in article 31(2) of the Charter? This 
question arose in Dominguez but the CJEU refused to engage with it, reverting instead to its 
traditional stance that directives do not have horizontal effect.90 
Finally, the post-Charter case law continues to show the purposive/teleological approach 
will not always lead to an interpretation that protects employees. Although the CJEU has 
held, in the context of rolled up holiday pay that article 7 WTD does not preclude the loss of 
paid leave provided that the worker actually had the opportunity to take leave,91 that right 
is qualified where a worker is on prolonged sick leave, with the risk of accumulated periods 
of leave that this would entail.92 The CJEU here used the purposive approach to achieve an 
employer-protective reading of the legislation, holding that ‘…in light of the actual purpose 
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of the right to paid annual leave…a worker who is unfit for work for several consecutive 
years and who is prevented by national law from taking its paid annual leave during that 
period cannot have the right to accumulate, without limits’.93 The CJEU went on to note that 
any ‘….carry-over period must also protect the employer from the risk that a worker will 
accumulate periods of absence of too great a length and from the difficulties for the 
organisation of work which such periods might entail’.94 This appears to be no more than a 
standard application of the purposive approach until we consider that no such employer-
protective purpose is mentioned in the Directive. 
To conclude then, the post-Charter case law on the WTD is an exercise in continuity. The 
extent of the Charter’s added value appears to be that the CJEU is more comfortable in 
relying on a written text. To this extent, the CJEU has been emboldened in that its long held 
approach to treating paid leave as an important social right has now essentially been 
codified by the legislature, although there is a certain irony in a return to textualism to 
boost a purposive approach. More democratically legitimate it may be, revolutionary it is 
not. The same cannot be said in the context of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive.  
ii. Transfer of Undertakings Directive  
We have seen that in the working time context, the Charter does little, if any, of the heavy 
lifting. By contrast, in the transfer of undertakings context, the Charter does not know its 
own strength and has been used to radically disrupt existing interpretative approaches and 
legislative balances. The potential use of the Charter as a destructive force in the 
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employment context became all too apparent in the wake of the CJEU’s decision in Alemo-
Herron.95 The question that arose in this case was whether, in a situation in which contracts 
incorporating the terms of collective agreements transfer to new employers, they should be 
bound only by those terms in force at the time of the transfer (static approach) or whether 
new collective agreements negotiated after the transfer should also bind the new employer 
(dynamic approach). The CJEU was essentially tasked with determining whether article 
3(1) TUD was to be interpreted as prohibiting the transfer of dynamic clauses.   
The Opinion of AG Cruz-Villalón appears to provide a strong, but nuanced commitment to 
contractual autonomy while at the same time acknowledging the legitimate social 
objectives of the TUD.96 As a starting point, the AG noted that the effect of the earlier 
decision of the CJEU in Werhof97 was clearly to rule out the possibility that the TUD 
required Member States to permit the transfer of dynamic clauses referring to future 
collective agreements. The AG concluded that ‘in the context of the transfer of an 
undertaking, there is no obstacle to Member States allowing a transfer of dynamic clauses 
referring to future collective agreements’.98 He noted that although the principal aim of the 
Directive was to protect workers in the event of a change of employer, there were also 
several employer-protective elements that could be discerned.99 This was his first misstep, 
as there is no such employer-protective purpose contained in the Directive. The AG 
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nevertheless went on to conclude that the TUD was no ‘impediment to the United Kingdom 
allowing parties to use dynamic clauses referring to future collective agreements and 
accepting that such clauses are transferable as a consequence of the transfer of an 
undertaking'.100 This part of the AG’s Opinion is no more than a confirmation of the 
accepted view that the TUD, far from constituting a ceiling on Member State action, would 
allow for the continuation of the long-standing English approach to dynamic clauses 
referring to future agreements.  
The next stage of the Opinion becomes more problematic, as in a somewhat surprising and 
indeed controversial move, the AG rather tersely dealt with the argument raised in Werhof 
that the freedom of association, which is guaranteed by both the Charter and the ECHR was 
being infringed. According to the AG, the issue was not that the new employer would be 
compelled to join an organisation in order to influence the contractual terms, but rather 
that it had no means of being so represented, as the relevant negotiating body was public, 
not private.101 The real issue according to the AG was the employer’s ‘fundamental right to 
conduct a business’, this was apparently despite the fact that the company had failed to 
raise this as an argument.102 This is the most controversial aspect of the AG’s Opinion as he 
appears to raise of his own volition, the hitherto rarely invoked freedom to conduct a 
business contained in the Charter. 
In any event, despite highlighting the importance of the freedom to conduct a business in 
Article 16, which includes freedom of contract, the AG went on to hold that a dynamic 
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interpretation would not run contrary to article 16 so long as it was not unconditional or 
irreversible.103 The AG noted that although freedom of contract was indeed a component of 
the freedom to conduct a business, the absence of extended rulings on the matter and the 
lack of binding force of collective agreements in the UK meant that article 16 had not been 
violated in the present case.104 What we can take from this Opinion is that although the AG 
reached the correct conclusion, the path to that conclusion was paved with a distortion of 
the purposive approach to interpretation. The AG interpreted the TUD through the lens of a 
purpose that it does not have, namely the need to consider the interests of the employer. 
The CJEU would simply take this abuse of existing interpretative methods to its logical 
conclusion.   
The CJEU, in adopting the German static approach, held that where a transferee does not 
have the opportunity to participate in negotiations that are concluded after the date of 
transfer, the outcome of the negotiations should not be binding. The Directive must 
therefore be interpreted as precluding dynamic clauses referring to collective agreements 
negotiated after the date of transfer being enforceable against the transferee.105 Like the AG, 
the CJEU held that a fair balance must be sought between the competing interests of 
employers and employees with due weight being given to the employer’s freedom of 
contract found in Article 16 of the Charter: 
[i]t is apparent that, by reason of the freedom to conduct a business, the transferee 
must be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is 
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party and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of 
its employees with a view to its future economic activity. 106 
To hold otherwise would be to reduce employer freedom ‘to the point that such a limitation 
is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’.107 The 
CJEU went on to note that a dynamic interpretation would limit the employer’s room for 
manoeuvre to make adjustments and changes, particularly given that ‘the transfer is of an 
undertaking from the public sector to the private sector, the continuation of the transferee’s 
operations will require significant adjustments and changes, given the inevitable 
differences in working conditions that exist between those two sectors'.108 Given the 
employer’s need for room to manoeuvre, the dynamic interpretation would be ‘liable to 
undermine the fair balance between the interests of the transferee in its capacity as 
employer, on the one hand, and those of the employees, on the other’.109 
There are number of problematic elements to the CJEU’s adoption of this interpretation of 
the TUD. In the first instance, it represents a distortion of the purpose of a directive which 
is explicitly employee-protective. It certainly appears that the CJEU has reached a 
conclusion as to the purpose it thinks the TUD should have rather than one it actually does 
have. In addition, the two stage analysis adopted by the CJEU apparently reveals its 
predisposition to reject the dynamic approach. The CJEU proceeded in two steps, the first 
of which was to find that there was a need to reconcile the competing aims of the Directive, 
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that is to say between the protection of employees and the need for employer flexibility. 
This approach is, of course, in and of itself controversial and it appears that the CJEU felt 
compelled to reinforce this novel reading of the Directive by turning to article 16, 
regardless of the future consequences for employment regulation. This is not the CJEU’s 
only violation of the text. Indeed, the CJEU’s reasoning is based on the false assumption that 
the TUD requires such an explicit balancing of employer and employee interests in the first 
place.110 Lord Hope in the UK Supreme Court pointed out that ‘[n]o mention was made in 
the recitals of any need to protect employers in the event of a change in employer as 
against the rights that were to be safeguarded for the protection of employees’.111 Rather, it 
could be said that the very logic behind the TUD is the restriction of contractual autonomy 
in order to protect employees. It is perhaps therefore ‘ironic that Werhof and Alemo-Herron 
render the operation of the transfer of undertakings legislation potentially less favourable 
to the transferring employees than that which the common law interpretation…would 
produce'.112 This is a damning indictment and demonstrates that the approach adopted in 
Alemo-Herron is fatally to undermine the very purpose of the legislation.  
The judgment also ignores the wording of article 8 TUD which provides that Member States 
may introduce more favourable protection than that provided under the Directive.  The 
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CJEU in its rejection of the dynamic interpretation appears to have upturned this provision, 
transforming it from a floor to a ceiling. This has worrying implications for other pieces of 
EU employment legislation and may potentially spell the end of minimum 
harmonisation.113  
Another difficulty with the CJEU’s interpretation of the TUD in this case is that it appears to 
run contrary to decades of existing case law on the concept of contractual autonomy and 
business freedom.114 In its earlier case law on the matter, article 16 had largely been 
neglected by the CJEU, which seemed ‘unreceptive to any embrace of newly aggressive 
deregulatory bite driven by the Charter’.115 Even in cases where the CJEU accepted the 
application of article 16, it was heavily conditioned by competing social interests, notably 
the protection of consumers. Alemo-Herron can therefore be said to constitute a significant 
departure from existing case law on contractual autonomy.116 It is becoming apparent that 
the elevation of freedom of contract to the status of a fundamental right in article 16 has 
made all the difference, at least in the mind of the CJEU. 
                                                          
113 Marija Bartl and Candida Leone, ‘Minimum Harmonisation and Article 16 CFR: Difficult Times Ahead for 
Social Legislation?’ Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-40.   
114 Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I-
415; Case C-240/97 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-6571 para 99; Case C-4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491.  
115 Stephen Weatherill, 'Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper 
Veneration of “Freedom of Contract” - Comment on Case C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure' 
(2014) 10 ERCL 167, 177.  
116 ibid 167.  
39 
 
Prassl argues that the real problem with the CJEU’s approach to freedom of contract lies 
neither with its recognition of contractual autonomy as a general principle nor with its 
application of the Charter. Rather, it ‘is the aggressive interpretation of the hitherto rarely 
applied Article 16…to justify the abrogation of employees’ rights that breaks with well-
established case law’.117 Furthermore, the CJEU adopts a subtle yet fundamental change in 
language between the present case and its earlier jurisprudence on freedom of contract. In 
Scarlet Extended for example, the CJEU noted that a ‘fair balance’ needed to be achieved 
between article 16 and competing fundamental rights.118 In Alemo-Herron on the other 
hand, the CJEU has moved towards the test of the ‘core content’ or ‘very essence’ (despite 
continuing to use the language of balancing). Under the former, Scarlet Extended test, 
litigants merely had to show that the outcome represented a fair compromise between two 
competing fundamental rights of equal value. The latter Alemo-Herron approach requires 
that the irreducible core of one right has not been affected ie there is no need to balance. 
Once the core content of contractual autonomy has been eroded, it is irrelevant that a 
competing—and perhaps stronger—social right has been invoked. It is apparent that this 
case represents an unexpected rupture with existing jurisprudence and aptly demonstrates 
the potential use of the Charter to defend employer flexibility against the protection of 
employees. Weatherill has been particularly scathing in his assessment of Alemo-Herron, 
remarking that sometimes ‘a decision of the Court of Justice…is so downright odd that it 
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deserves to be locked into a secure container, plunged into the icy waters of a deep lake 
and forgotten about’.119 
In its decisions immediately following Alemo-Herron the CJEU appeared to have realised 
the error of its ways and has shied away from invoking the Charter. In Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund, a case also concerning the interpretation of article 3 TUD, the CJEU 
relied on the most uncontroversial elements of Alemo-Herron while (deliberately?) 
overlooking article 16 of the Charter.120 This case concerned the potential continuation, in 
the event of a transfer, of the effects of a rescinded collective agreement. The CJEU was 
asked whether article 3(3) TUD must be interpreted as also covering terms laid down 
under a collective agreement which have continuing effect indefinitely under national law, 
despite the termination of the agreement, until a new agreement—whether collective or 
individual—has been concluded. The CJEU noted that the purpose of article 3(3) TUD was 
not the continuation of collective agreements as such, but rather the terms and conditions 
of employment, regardless of their origin.121 Therefore, such terms come within the scope 
of the Directive, ‘irrespective of the method used to make those terms…applicable to the 
persons concerned’, including in this case national legislation maintaining the effects of 
collectively agreed terms.122 Such an interpretation accords with the purpose of the TUD, 
which is to avoid a sudden rupture in the terms and conditions of employment. In addition, 
the interpretation adopted conforms to the TUD’s (contested) objectives of ensuring a fair 
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balance between the interests of employees and the transferee employer who must, citing 
Alemo-Herron ‘be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on 
its operations’.123  
The CJEU, adopting a generous approach held that ‘[t]he rule maintaining the effects of a 
collective agreement…has limited effects, since it maintains only the legal effects of a 
collective agreement on the employment relationships directly subject to it before its 
rescission…In those circumstances, it does not appear that such a rule hinders the 
transferee’s ability to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its 
operations’.124 The contrast between both the tone and substance of this judgment at that 
adopted in Alemo-Herron is remarkable. In the former, the CJEU has no difficulty in 
concluding that the continuation of the collective agreement does not interfere with the 
employer’s room for manoeuvre, while in the latter, an equally innocuous provision is 
struck down as intolerable interference. It certainly appeared as if the CJEU was willing to 
invoke only the least controversial elements of Alemo-Herron, that is to say the principle of 
contractual autonomy stripped of the trappings of a fundamental right. In any case, it now 
seems that article 16 when used an interpretative tool has the potential to disrupt both 
existing legislative balances and long-standing approaches to the interpretation of 
employment legislation. But why is this the case? What is it about article 16 that renders it 
such a powerful tool of interpretation, while the Charter’s social provisions barely make a 
difference? Does the CJEU simply have a predisposition to prioritise the economic rights 
over the social?  
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B. Fundamental rights à la carte?  
As can be seen from the above, a difference appears to be emerging between the CJEU’s use 
of the economic and social provisions in the Charter. Not only do the social provisions, 
dismissed as ‘principles’, appear to be weaker interpretative tools, but the CJEU seems to 
be actively preferring the freedom to conduct a business over competing social rights. If we 
look at Alemo-Herron itself we see that no attempt was made to engage with competing 
Charter provisions that may have acted as a counterweight to contractual autonomy. This 
appears to be a fundamental problem. Unless the CJEU chooses to engage with a Charter 
provision, then it will of necessity have no impact in its approach to interpretation. Of 
course, even within the working time context, the Charter’s use has been most prevalent in 
paid leave cases. As Bogg warns, ‘the interests of a coherent interpretive approach, there is 
a need for greater consistency of interpretive practice in relation to the rights…Otherwise 
there is a risk of serious distortion if Article 31 is applied selectively, as seems to be the 
situation currently’.125 
We also see that in cases such as AMS and Dominguez the CJEU is very careful to avoid the 
Charter’s social provisions becoming directly enforceable individual rights either because 
they are not sufficiently clear and precise, or because they are dependent on national laws 
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and practices.126 Article 16 faces no such limitations despite its similar wording. In fact, in 
the context of the freedom to conduct a business, the CJEU, as we have seen, appears willing 
to ignore precedent, including its long standing case law on contractual autonomy as a 
general principle. It does so in a manner which overrides the limitations contained in the 
case law and which is expressly referenced in the Explanations attached to the Charter. It is 
certainly apparent from this case that the CJEU is willing to give precedence to an 
employer’s freedom of contract over the rights of employees as expressed in legislation.127 
Even if a piece of employment legislation engages article 16 (as it almost invariably would), 
it is likely to have been carefully drafted to assess competing interests with the legislature 
having decided on the correct balance to be achieved. In its case law on freedom of contract 
as a general principle, and in its early jurisprudence on article 16, the CJEU certainly 
appeared to adopt this deferential approach to the will of the legislature. EU legislation was 
only rarely found to constitute a negation of the core content of business freedom. For 
Prassl, this test  ‘is likely to constitute the most important hurdle to the success of any 
action brought to vindicate an individual’s economic freedoms under Article 16 CFR, 
especially once it is applied in combination with the Court’s proportionality scrutiny 
against a right’s social function’.128 However, it is difficult to square this with the decision in 
Alemo-Herron. In that case, the CJEU found that what had been considered no more than an 
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ordinary application of the common law freedom of contract did in fact violate the very 
core of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right. Had Alemo-Herron involved a clash 
between two competing fundamental rights, one social and one economic, would the 
outcome have been any different? The evidence to date does not appear promising.  
Undoubtedly, the approach the CJEU appears to be adopting is to be welcomed from the 
perspective of employers. Labour lawyers on the other hand should be worried indeed. The 
best-case scenario may be that the CJEU will confine this expansive approach to the limited 
context of the transfer of undertakings, while preserving its employee-protective reading of 
legislation in other contexts. The worst-case scenario paints a very bleak picture for the 
future of EU regulation in both the employment context and beyond. Article 16 can now be 
seen as having the potential to undermine the existing balances that have been achieved in 
EU employment legislation by requiring a higher threshold of justification for EU 
regulatory intervention. It is certainly apparent from reaction to Alemo-Herron that the 
deregulatory potential of article 16 was largely underestimated and perhaps continues to 
be so. This can be seen in a recent raft of cases in the employment context in which article 
16 has made an appearance. In her recent Opinion on an employer’s banning of a headscarf 
in the workplace, AG Kokott found that ‘the employer must be allowed a degree of 
discretion in the pursuit of its business, the basis for which lies ultimately in the 
fundamental right of freedom to conduct a business… Part of that freedom is the 
employer’s right, in principle, to determine how and under what conditions the roles 
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within its organisation are organised and performed and in what form its products and 
services are offered’.129 She goes on to stipulate that: 
In a Union which regards itself as being committed to a social market 
economy…and seeks to achieve this in accordance with the requirements of 
an open market economy with free competition…the importance that 
attaches to the freedom to conduct a business is not to be underestimated. 
That fundamental right, which, previously, already constituted a general 
principle of EU law, is now enshrined in a prominent position in Article 16 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.130 
Accordingly, the employer’s freedom to conduct a business would allow him to derogate 
from the prohibition on discrimination contained in the Equal Treatment Directive. 
Tellingly, it is now article 16 that is being cited without any reference to Alemo-Herron 
rather than the other way around. The approach to article 16 adopted by AG Kokott can be 
contrasted with that taken by AG Sharpston in another recent Opinion in Bougnaoui.131 In 
that case, the AG found that the employer had not advanced any commercial interest in its 
relations with its customers that could justify the prohibition on wearing the headscarf. She 
goes on to repeat the formula found in the CJEU’s earlier case law that whilst the freedom 
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to conduct a business is a general principle that has now been enshrined in the Charter, it 
must be reviewed in relation to its function in society.132  
Another highly deregulatory opinion has recently been handed down by AG Wahl in 
AGET.133 This case concerned the compatibility of Greek legislation with the Collective 
Redundancies Directive and article 49 TFEU on freedom of establishment. The opening 
paragraph makes for sober reading for any labour lawyer: ‘The European Union is based on 
a free market economy, which implies that undertakings must have the freedom to conduct 
their business as they see fit’.134 Despite holding that ‘it follows from Article 52(1) of the 
Charter and the case-law of the Court that the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed 
under Article 16 of the Charter is not absolute, and may be regulated’,135 he went to find 
that the freedom of establishment must be read in light of the freedom to conduct a 
business.136 The AG recognised that a balance must be struck between the protection of 
workers and the freedom of establishment of employers. Therefore, a similar balance had 
to be struck between article 16 and competing social provisions in the Charter.137 However, 
the AG went on to find that no such social provision was capable of counteracting 
contractual autonomy. Article 27 concerning worker information and consultation was 
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found to be irrelevant given the CJEU’s judgment in AMS, finding that such a provision 
would require specific expression in EU or national law to be fully effective.138 Although the 
Collective Redundancies Directive could have been considered a specific expression of 
article 27 (and perhaps article 30), it was found not to apply to the present case. The AG 
was particularly concerned about interfering with the legislative compromise reached as to 
unilaterally impose ‘additional obligations on the employers, thereby removing the 
workers’ incentive to take part in negotiations with the employers, without providing for 
any compensatory safeguard mechanisms which take into account the employers’ 
situation, risks upsetting that equilibrium from the point of view of Article 49 TFEU and 
Article 16 of the Charter’.139 Bizarrely, in the commercial context article 16 does not fare so 
well, with the CJEU dismissing outright arguments based on this provision.140 But in the 
employment field it appears to be rising from Weatherill’s icy lake. Whether it is 
resurrected as an interpretative tool is as yet unknown.  
V.  A brief note on Brexit  
What are the consequences of Brexit for the continued use of fundamental rights in the 
interpretation of UK employment legislation? Undoubtedly, a lot depends on the model 
chosen to govern the UK’s future relationship with the EU. The UK’s attitude to the Charter 
has always been rather hostile, and it appears that the ambiguous opt-out will be granted 
full fruition. Of course, it may not be as simple as that. Should the UK adopt the Norway 
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model of joining EFTA, the Charter will formally cease to be of application in the UK. That is 
not to say that the Charter will become irrelevant.141 As Wahl remarks, ‘[f[rom the absence 
of incorporation one cannot just assume that the Charter does not have any effects of a 
secondary and/or indirect nature. Such ancillary effects can be significant and should in 
any event not be underestimated’.142 Such effects can in particular, be achieved via the 
principle of homogeneity which governs the relationship between the EEA Agreement and 
EU law. The EFTA Court itself has stated that the that ‘the objective of establishing a 
dynamic and homogenous European Economic Area can only be achieved if EFTA and EU 
citizens, as well as economic operators enjoy, relying on EEA law, the same rights in both 
the EU and EFTA pillars of the EEA’.143 The homogeneity principle extends to fundamental 
rights, with the Court referring to judgments of the ECtHR and CJEU as well as AG Opinions 
in fundamental rights cases. 144 Specifically in the employment context, the EEA Agreement 
incorporates all of the EU Directives on health and safety, equality law and labour law. 
Having said that, ‘most of the principles have been developed by the Court of Justice and 
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the EFTA Court has faithfully applied them’.145 As such, the EFTA Court has closely 
shadowed the CJEU’s interpretation of employment legislation, notably in the context of the 
transfer of undertakings.146 In Deveci , the EFTA Court noted that the Charter was formally 
of no application. Nevertheless, it went on to rely on Alemo-Herron without mentioning 
article 16 of the Charter. 147 According to the Court, ‘[t]he EEA Agreement has linked the 
markets of the EEA/EFTA States to the single market of the European Union. The actors of 
a market are, inter alia, undertakings. The freedom to conduct a business lies therefore at 
the heart of the EEA Agreement and must be recognised in accordance with EEA law and 
national laws and practices. Thus, the freedom to conduct a business seems to have become 
a general principle of EEA law and risks being deployed in a similar disruptive way. In the 
event of a ‘clean’ Brexit, there will be no EU employment legislation in the UK to which the 
Charter can be applied. In that case, we must once again turn to the incorporation of 
fundamental rights through the common law. It is not difficult to imagine, however, that 
unabashed contractual autonomy will be the order of the day. Although the removal of a 
large common law jurisdiction is unlikely to influence the CJEU’s interpretative method, the 
UK is likely to see a return to a decidedly less purposive interpretation of its own 
legislation. It has long been apparent that ‘UK courts ‘have tended to deploy an 
interpretative approach that is decidedly non-purposive, construing specific provisions in 
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the working time context without locating the interpretive exercise within a wider 
understanding of fundamental social rights’.148 
Conclusion  
From a brief analysis of the use of the Charter as an interpretative tool, we can see that it is 
both evolutionary and revolutionary. It is evolutionary in that the social rights derive 
largely from pre-existing legislation which has long been given a purposive and usually 
employee-friendly reading. It is revolutionary in that the economic freedoms, although 
similarly steeped in long standing jurisprudence, have emboldened the CJEU to disrupt 
existing approaches to the interpretation of legislation. What the case law does show is that 
there is a glimmer hope that the Charter’s social provisions may have bite but only if the 
CJEU choses to engage with them in any meaningful way. Even if the social provisions lack 
any real force as tools of interpretation that is not to deny the other uses to which they may 
be put. One might wonder whether the Charter’s social rights may act as a constraint on the 
EU legislature’s ability to amend existing employment legislation if that legislation, 
whether or not that legislation has been explicitly tied to the Charter via the 
Explanations.149 As the CJEU’s pick and choose approach demonstrates, however, such an 
outcome is far from guaranteed. Of course, the present paper may be open to similar 
criticisms of being overly selective, having engaged only with articles 31 and 16 of the 
Charter. Having said that, it has long been accepted that art 31 is the strongest of the social 
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rights contained in the Charter, being free from any constraints of ‘EU law or national laws 
and practices’. If such a provision has proven incapable of influencing the CJEU’s approach 
to interpretation, then it is unlikely that any social provision can. It can only be hoped that 
the CJEU will abandon its formalistic approach to the Charter by embracing a more holistic 
analysis of all of its provisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
